MEASURING THE COST OF AID VOLATILITY
We treat aid fl ows as the uncertain return on an unobserved asset of "global goodwill" held by developing countries. We then calculate the certainty equivalent value of the volatile aid fl ows as well as an associated dead weight loss, using a capital asset pricing model.
Our measure of the deadweight loss per dollar provided in aid permits a comparison of costs across donors and over time. We fi nd that the costs of volatility rose steadily until 2002, and have since fallen.
Aid volatility is similar for low and middle income countries; weak states and strong states; aid dependent and low-aid countries; and across regions. Aid volatility differs substantially, however, by donor. We infer that donor policies contribute to volatility and that they should make reducing volatility a strong priority.
Key Findings
ODA is much more volatile than major macro variables: fi ve times as volatile as GDP and three times as volatile as exports for the average recipient. ODA typically magnifi es real business cycles in recipient countries.
The aid system generates massive negative income shocks to some developing countries (on rare occasions). These large negative shocks account for the high cost of volatility. The impact of aid shocks has been as large and as frequent as income shocks faced by developed countries during the two World Wars, the Great Depression and the Spanish Civil War.
The deadweight loss associated with aid volatility is between 15 and 20 percent of the total value of aid in recent years. At current aid levels, this loss is about $16 billion.
From the average recipient's perspective, the deadweight loss is about 1.9 percent of GDP.
Volatility costs between $0.07 and $0.28 per dollar of aid, depending on the donor. Despite this determination, there has not been much progress in actually reducing aid volatility and some researchers, like Bulir and Hamann (2006) , have argued that aid volatility has actually become worse in recent years. This is disappointing as the benefi ts from reducing volatility and using aid as a smoothing device are thought to be very high. Pallage, Robe and Berube (2006) conclude that the welfare gain from improving the timing of aid fl ows could reach 5.5 percent of permanent consumption in aid-recipient countries. Because aid provides an exogenous instrument for directly infl uencing consumption volatility in recipient countries, it serves to overcome Lucas's (2003) observation that regardless of cost one should only worry about volatility if there is a mechanism for reducing it. In this paper we propose a metric for measuring aid volatility with a focus on aid as a smoothing device for developing countries.
Several studies have documented the cost of aid volatility and the channels through which this operates. 1 At a macroeconomic level, aid volatility has been shown to cause volatility in some aggregate variable such as infl ation (Fielding and Mavrotas 2005) , real exchange rates (Schnabel 2007) , or fi scal policy (Fatas and Mihov 2008) . Volatility in these variables, in turn, has been shown to reduce aggregate growth.
An alternative approach is to directly estimate reduced form equations linking volatility in macroeconomic aggregates or aid volatility to lower growth. 2 This literature systematically suggests that volatility is costly, particularly in less developed countries with weak institutions.
Despite this evidence, aid volatility has not been taken seriously by policymakers. There are several explanations as to why. First, the policy conclusion from the finding that high aid volatility reduces growth is blurred. One can try to minimize aid volatility, or develop mechanisms to break the link between aid volatility and the policy variable of choice, or develop institutions to limit the impact of volatility on growth.
For example, foreign exchange reserve management could in theory be used to address issues of aid and exchange rate volatility. Thus, it is hard to establish that dealing with aid volatility is in fact the priority or fi rst best response. this kind of volatility is regarded as a good thing. In other words, aid volatility can have a smoothing or insurance function, depending on whether it is procyclical or countercyclical. For some donors, the ability to reduce aid to corrupt governments or increase aid to reformist governments after a major confl ict or crisis is also considered to be a good form of volatility.
Hence differentiating between good and bad volatility is required.
A third problem is that the nature of evidence on the costs of aid volatility is often questioned. Some policymakers dismiss estimates based on cross-country empirical work because of well-known issues with low robustness of results. In other cases, costs are based on simulated parameters for a welfare function (which can be debated) or on a computable general equilibrium model with stylized coeffi cients. 4 The few examples of country case studies tend to document subjective costs, like "diffi culties in planning and budgeting," which are important but hard to quantify.
Donors are increasingly working at the country level and want an answer to the question "how much does volatility cost country X."
In this paper, we try to overcome these problems by applying a new approach based on a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to calculate the deadweight loss from aid volatility. Such an approach provides a simple, quantitative measure of the cost of aid volatility in a framework that differentiates between "good" and "bad" volatility for each recipient country and that is decomposable in terms of the contribution of each donor country to volatility. 5 In this way, policymakers can understand both the aggregate ineffi ciencies of the current system, the distribution of costs across recipient countries and the contribution of major donors to these costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We sketch out why a basic CAPM approach, and Sharpe's risk-adjusted performance measure, can be usefully applied to thinking about aid volatility.
The next section looks at the nature of aid shocks. The use of a Sharpe ratio as the price of risk in applying the CAPM presumes that a developed capital market properly values risk. There is no a priori reason to believe that this should be the case, and this has given rise to what is known as the "equity premium puzzle."
Recently, Barro (2006) develops an argument made by Rietz (1988) that suggests that the risk premium on US markets can be rationally explained by the frequency and size of major disasters. As Barro notes, with diminishing marginal utility of consumption, bonanzas do not count nearly as much as disasters for the pricing of assets and he shows that the frequency of major disasters is high enough to explain the risk premium on US stocks. The frequency of major aid shortfalls, computed in this section, is if anything even higher than the frequency of major income shortfalls in a developed country. It is probably reasonable to believe that developing countries are likely to place an even higher discount on risk than investors in the US stock market. Thus, the computed deadweight losses can be taken as a lower bound of the cost of aid volatility.
We compute the deadweight loss from aid volatility and apportion this to each major donor. The cost appears high, reaching around 15 percent of actual aid fl ows. This translates into a deadweight loss of around $16 billion annually in the current system. We also show that the cost of aid volatility has been growing over time, although it may have peaked in 2000 and improved slightly since then.
Section 4 looks at aid as insurance, separating "good"
volatility from "bad" volatility. We look at the role of aid in smoothing or exaggerating cycles in foreign exchange earnings and income. 6 Using portfolio valuation approaches, the deadweight loss from aid and the apportionment of this loss to individual donors is adjusted accordingly. Taken together, our results suggest that aid volatility is a high priority issue, that some donors are more responsible than others for this, and that measures to reduce volatility would signifi cantly enhance the value of aid.
Approach
T he approach of this study is to measure the cost of aid volatility using a Markowitz mean-variance framework that is the basis of modern fi nance theory.
The CAPM is particularly well suited to valuing a stream of uncertain cash fl ows and provides a natural way to value international aid fl ows. In this framework, we treat aid fl ows as if they are the uncertain returns on an (unobserved) asset held by a developing country (its "global goodwill"). The "return" to the asset, the observed annual fl ow of aid, has a mean and variance that are summary statistics that suffi ce to measure the value of the underlying asset. The procedure is conceptually simple: fi rst convert the uncertain fl ow of aid into a certainty equivalent amount; second, discount the certainty equivalent amount by the risk-free interest rate to obtain the value of "global goodwill."
One advantage of fi nance theory is that it provides a mechanism for computing the certainty equivalence which does not require information on the degree of risk-aversion of the aid recipient country. Instead, it prices risk using data from international financial markets. In this paper, we use the price of risk as determined in markets in the United States-the so-called Sharpe ratio. This is the second measure we use. Some analysts feel that donors might adjust their giving in response to repayment obligations -so-called defensive lending-in order to maintain a degree of stability in net transfers.
To the extent that this is an accurate portrayal of donor behavior (and there is some evidence to support The advantage of using net ODA is that it is the most comprehensive measure of support to a country. The disadvantage is that it is actually a composite measure of two different items: gross disbursements less repayments on past aid credits.
cal assistance, debt relief, food aid, and humanitarian assistance. We also subtract interest payments made, so as to arrive at a true fi gure of cash fl ow received by the recipient country. This concept of aid is closest in spirit to the concept of a "dividend" payout on global goodwill.
Rather than arbitrarily choosing between these measures, we report results using all three. While the magnitudes of the deadweight losses differ, the same pattern emerges.
Aid shocks
Aid shocks can be best understood as the difference between aid amounts and some expected value.
Because we are using fi nance techniques, the absolute amount of aid is used. 9 These aid fl ows are obtained in constant dollar terms. It is now widely recognized that aid fl ows are non-stationary so it is appropriate to work in fi rst differences (Bulir and Hamman 2006).
Thus, the basic model is that the change in aid from donor i to recipient j at time t, A ijt , is driven by a constant term refl ecting the donor-recipient relationship, a ij , and a random error, e ijt :
(1)
Summing this across all donors yields
Equation (2) It is also interesting to note that the measure of aid cash fl ows (i.e., CPA) is more volatile than total aid, despite the fact that the latter includes debt relief and humanitarian assistance, both of which are thought of as being highly volatile. The intuition is simple. If aid is a fi xed aggregate, then more humanitarian assistance also implies less money for projects and programs.
Thus CPA will also exhibit high volatility when it is a substitute for humanitarian assistance. between two years. We defi ne major aid shortfalls as those which involve a loss of per capita income of more than 15 percent, the same criterion as used by Barro (2006) and it is only these that are shown in Figure 1 . We look at shortfalls over two years, on the grounds that it may take time between the policy decision to reduce aid and actual aid fl ows.
For two year aid differences, we fi nd 72 episodes of large shortfalls out of 4,192 country-year observations. That is, the probability of an aid shortfall pro- ceipts. In other words, the aid system has generated the same negative shocks to per capita income in per capita incomes in developing countries, and with more frequency, as the two World Wars and the Great Depression generated in developed countries. Table 2 lists the country-year observations of major aid shortfalls for net ODA. Twenty-six developing countries have witnessed at least one major aid shortfall, and of these 15 countries have had more than one such episode. More than half are in Africa, and the remainder are from across the world. Unsurprisingly, most are small economies. This follows because an aid shock of this magnitude requires both high volatility (numerator) and high aid dependence (low denominator). The broad range of countries experiencing a major aid shock, however, suggests that many countries might realistically be concerned about a major shortfall at some point in time.
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The frequency of major aid shortfalls is at least as large as the frequency of major income shortfalls in developed countries. Barro (2006) argues that such income collapse episodes are the underlying rationale for the equity market premium for volatility. If this line of reasoning is accepted, then it is reasonable to suppose that the discount associated with aid volatility would be at least as high as the discount for volatility in developed country equity markets. 
The capital asset pricing model applied to aid
The fi nance ministers would make a calculation based on a CAPM. The CAPM is a simple mechanism for associating the required return on an asset with its risk.
The higher the risk, the higher the return required for an asset to be held in an effi cient portfolio. The CAPM shows that this relationship is a straight line. The value of global goodwill in period t is, by defi nition, the expected value of the aid fl ow in period t+1, E(A jt+1 ), discounted by a risky return that compensates for the volatility of aid, E(r at+1 ):
From Figure 2 , it is easy to compute the risky return to be used in discounting the aid fl ow: 
Calculating the deadweight loss from aid volatility
Equation (3) To measure the cost of aid volatility more specifi cally, we can use Equation (6) 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 World On average, our results suggest that countries lose about 2 percent of GDP because of aid volatility. But sub-Saharan African countries and small Pacifi c island economies are much more sensitive to volatility because of low levels of GDP and high aid dependency.
For the most aid dependent countries, the losses total almost 7 percent of GDP. Low income countries and weak states also have much higher losses from aid volatility.
Interpreting the deadweight losses from aid volatility
The deadweight losses computed above are fi nancial and hypothetical in that no actual market transactions are taking place, so we do not observe any values for "global goodwill" that would permit us to compute deadweight losses directly. The computations refl ect comparisons of aid portfolios. But would a fi nance minister really take less aid totals in return for reduced volatility? The answer is probably "yes."
Countries incur substantial real costs from volatility so welfare could be raised by accepting a smaller total amount in return for lower volatility.
To see how deadweight losses manifest themselves in the real world, it is useful to make an analogy to corporate fi nance. There, it is common to analyze the problems faced by a fi rm raising fi nances for investment. Typically, such analysis focuses on the transaction costs of raising money and the uncertainty as to how much money needs to be raised. If there were no transaction costs to raising money, fi rms would sim- In the case of a country, many of the same issues arise. The fi nancial planning problem can be thought of as a two-stage process (Martin and Morgan 1988).
In the fi rst stage, there is an evaluation of how much money will be required in the next period. In the sec- The combination of these effects pushes a fi rm (or a fi nance minister) to develop a predictable fi nancing plan, even if that entails some real costs compared to the "fi nance-as-you-go" alternative. Note that in this model the deadweight losses depend on transaction costs in the market for fi nance as well as on uncertainty over the required finance. This theme is further developed by Aghion et al. (2005) . In that model, there are two types of investment: shortterm investment which generates output relatively fast; and long-term investment which contributes more to productivity growth but which carries the risk that it will be interrupted by an exogenous credit shock. When long-term investment is interrupted, it produces a zero return. In such a world, Aghion et al. show that volatility in domestic liquidity results in a change in the composition of domestic investment away from growth-enhancing long-term investment, and that this effect is largest when domestic fi nancial markets are less developed. As most of the countries in our "high aid shock" cases indeed have rudimentary domestic fi nancial markets, the deadweight loss due to aid volatility can be ascribed to sub-optimal decisions being made in the composition of investment due to risk-aversion by investors. A fi nance minister would care about such losses.
Other channels for deadweight losses from aid volatility have also been proposed. Because aid is often linked with fi scal spending (indeed, much aid is disbursed only after budget expenditures have actually been made), volatility in aid is linked with volatility in fi scal spending and hence with volatility in the real exchange rate. Real exchange rate volatility, in turn, has been linked to lower growth by Schnabel (2007) and Optimum fi rm fi nancing behavior can best be interpreted as a decision to smooth the amount of fi nancing needed so as to minimize the need to negotiate with additional lenders.
by Tressel and Prati (2006) , presumably through the impact on behavior of exporters.
Fatas and Mihov (2008) is taken away it is more highly valued than the benefi t when it is fi rst received. Other experiments suggest reference-based utility-that people care about changes in consumption as well as about absolute levels. In these circumstances, the response of people to uncertainty is likely to be quite different from the predicted response. Indeed, behavioral theory would suggest that a rational response to uncertainty over aid is to accumulate aid in the form of international reserves, and not make signifi cant change in consumption or investment for fear that these decisions may need to be reversed at a later date if there is an aid shortfall. Some recent empirical work suggests that indeed much aid is saved in this fashion.
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Donor contribution to deadweight losses from aid volatility
Total aid to a country is simply the sum of each donor's aid to that country. This identity permits a decomposition of the deadweight losses from aid volatility into deadweight losses associated with each donor. Denote each donor's share of aid to country j as x ij and the total aid received as X j . Equation (7) is a statistical identity which provides a measure of the contribution of each donor to total aid volatility. The contribution (C) is proportional to the standard deviation of each donor's aid and to the correlation between each donor's aid and the sum total of aid. Note that if a donor has a high correlation of its aid fl ows with other donors ("herd" behavior) its contribution to volatility gets magnifi ed.
Equation (8) 08 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 The lower values for losses attributed to aid volatility are also the result of the insurance element that aid can provide in some countries. Table 6 shows that aid tends to be procyclical with respect to exports and GDP, a fi nding that others have previously reported on. 23 In the sample, 54 percent of countries had net ODA which was positively correlated with exports. See Cassen, et al. (1994) for a complete summary. Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003) , Ramey and Ramey (1995) .
ENDNOTES
In this spirit, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) insistence that without such a measure the prospects for signifi cant change in the system are not good.
We also looked at aid and government revenues but found (to our surprise and disappointment) that revenue data are not readily available without loss of a signifi cant portion of the data set. It also proved impossible to break down aid into its on-budget and off-budget components.
See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.
Cf. Bulow and Rogoff (1990) , Geginat and Kraay (2007) .
Some analysts look at aid/capita or aid/GNP but there is little reason to consider such transformations. We are interested in the total value of aid and the discount associated with its volatility.
This fi nding was confi rmed through a cross-country regression analysis. The independent variables are not signifi cant determinants of aid volatility.
The defi nition and measure of weak states is taken from Rice and Patrick (2008) . This fi nding supports Levin and Dollar (2005) .
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Many countries witnessing aid shocks have had internal or external confl icts. But this does not necessarily justify high volatility. Donors could anticipate vulnerable situations and limit the degree of aid dependency for volatile countries.
There is also a recognition that donors might be withdrawing aid too rapidly from post-confl ict environments, as in East Timor, leading to cycles of large aid infl ows, withdrawals and renewed aid as a country cycles through confl ict periods.
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